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FORUM ON SRI LANKA
Post-war opportunities for peace in Sri Lanka: an ongoing challenge?
Nadeeka Arambewelaa∗ and Rodney Arambewelab
aFaculty of Arts and Education, Deakin University; bFaculty of Business and Law, Deakin
University, Melbourne, Australia
Peace is not the absence of conflict but the presence of creative alternatives for responding to
conflict – alternatives to passive or aggressive responses, alternatives to violence. (Dorothy
Thompson, 1893–1961, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dorothy_Thompson)
The defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009 brought a formal end to
the 30-year violent history of civil unrest and terrorist activity in Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon).
The war resulted in more than 100,000 deaths1 and the displacement of more than one million
people.2 Propelled by the strong public opinion against the LTTE, labelled one of the most ruth-
less terrorists organizations in the world, and reinforced by the population’s growing disillusion-
ment with the suffering caused by the war, the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) orchestrated a
focused, unforgiving mission to end the war by conclusively defeating LTTE terrorism.3
The complexity of the post-war environment is significant. The international community has
levelled accusations against the GoSL and the armed forces of human rights violations and war
crimes. Additionally, the confirmation of the death of the Tiger leader Prabhakaran in May, the
capture of the LTTE’s alleged international arms and funds procurement coordinator, Kumaran
Pathmanathan (aka ‘KP’), and the detention of thousands of displaced persons in camps, includ-
ing former LTTE cadres who were being rehabilitated, have added new dimensions and unique
issues to confront in developing peacebuilding strategies. The geopolitical dimension adds a par-
ticularly serious and threatening aspect to peacebuilding, with the apparent support for the
separatist Tiger movement in Tamil Nadu. This has origins in the Marumalarchi Dravida Mun-
netra Kazhagam (MDMK) campaign for the creation of a Tamil state in India and is reinforced
by the recent declaration by Vaiko, the Chief of MDMK, that his party will unite with the Tamil
diaspora to carry forward the Tamil struggle.4 This is further fortified by the alleged support
from the Tiger diaspora to continue to push the separatist political and ideological stance for
∗Corresponding author. Email: nadeeka00@gmail.com
1 There are different estimates of the actual death toll: for example, The Economist, 20 February 2010, quotes 80,000;
however it is widely acknowledged that the actual death toll is well above these estimates.
2 International Crisis Group, ‘Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace Process’, Asia Report; no. 124 (2006), http://www.
crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4523&l=1 (accessed January 12, 2010).
3 N.S. Venkataraman, ‘People of Sri Lanka Deserve Better’, Sri Lanka Guardian, February 15, 2010, http://www.
srilankaaguardian.org/2010/02/people of-Sri-lanka-deserve-better (accessed 15 February 2010); ‘Rebel: Sri Lanka
25 Year Long Civil War Reaches “Bitter End”’, USA Today, May 17, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/
world/2009-05-17-sri-lanka-N-htm (accessed January 12, 2010); A. Altman, ‘The End of Sri Lankan “Cataclysmic”
War’, Time, December 9, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1945379_1944421_
1944388,00.html (accessed February 11, 2010).
4 M. Mahadevan, ‘After Bloodbath Speech, Vaiko wants Tamil Eelam’, CNN-IBN, 9 April 2009.
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a Tamil homeland or ‘Eelam’.5 The recent development in relation to a Tamil transnational gov-
ernment is a case in point.
Not surprisingly, the end of the war raised the expectations amongst all community groups in
Sri Lanka (Sinhalese, Tamil, Muslim and Burgher) of sustainable peace and prosperity in the
country. Expectations were further reinforced by the presidential address to the nation on 18
May 2009 in which President Rajapaksa announced the end of the country’s civil war by
boldly claiming that ‘there won’t be any minorities in this country after today. . . . I want every-
body to feel like one . . . [I]t is necessary that the political solutions that they [those that love their
country of birth] need should be brought to them faster than any country or government in the
world would bring’. What followed were fiercely contested presidential elections on 26 January
2010 and the scheduling of a parliamentary election for April 2010. So, with armed conflict per-
ceived to be over and a post-war president brought into power on a policy platform of rebuilding
peace and establishing a sustainable economy in Sri Lanka, one is justified in asking: is peace an
elusive concept for Sri Lanka or is peace still possible?
This article has two objectives. Firstly, it attempts to analyze the current political climate in
Sri Lanka based on local media reports and anecdotal evidence from local people about their
expectations and experiences. This qualitative evidence was collected on the ground prior to
and immediately following the presidential elections. The second aim is to assess the key
factors that have contributed to the war in Sri Lanka by discussing historical interpretations
and post-colonial political reform. The article will then outline a sustainable path to peace
where all Sri Lankans can become co-owners of an inclusive peace process and where concrete
steps are taken towards reconstruction, reconciliation and democratic, participatory strategies in
political development and change.
The current political climate in Sri Lanka
There is no doubt that the end of the war has been a welcome relief to the entire Sri Lankan popu-
lation, however the post-war environment has remained unpredictable and uncertain. This has
been further compounded by the population’s rising expectations leveraged off the election
promises made during the presidential campaign. Throughout the campaigns, both presidential
candidates consistently claimed that the two most significant issues facing the country would be
addressed as matters of priority: the development of a strategy for conflict resolution and a
strategy for sustainable economic development.
Although these priorities were central themes in the election campaigns, anecdotal evidence
suggests that the widely-held local perception is that the GoSL’s strategic thrust has been to con-
solidate the power base of the president and that of the government by capitalizing on the war
victory, rather than focusing on the main issues of reconstruction and reconciliation.
Announcing presidential elections two years prior to the expiry of the term of office was con-
sidered politically advantageous because of the opportunity to capitalize on the war victory by
the incumbent president. This was also the case for the ruling party which was able to secure and
capitalize on successes in the provincial council elections held in the previous year and to
prepare political platforms for presidential elections. These provincial council victories facili-
tated the utilization of provincial council infrastructure to secure support for the incumbent
president. This was a clever political strategy as the country’s preoccupation shifted from
grievances associated with the war and post-war environment to now focus on the momentum
5 Raj Gonsalkorale, ‘Rise of the Global Tamil Forum; Ominous signs for Sri Lanka and India’, http://www.
asiantribune.com/news/2010/03/03/rise-global-tamil-forum-ominous-signs-sri-lanka-and-india (accessed March 4,
2010) – a special resolution was passed by the Global Tamil Forum in the UK ‘calling for a separate State for
Tamils in Sri Lanka, and recognizing the LTTE as the authentic representatives of the Tamil people’.
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created by the presidential election and the general election to follow. As one journalist in a
leading daily newspaper highlighted, the discussion on peace and stability in the country was
forgotten once elections were announced:
no one, starting with the Tamil polity for which it mattered a lot, is talking about rehabilitation or
reconstruction. With the result, constant references to the rehabilitation of the Tamil war-victims,
or IDPs [internally displaced persons], and reconstruction of war-ravaged Tamil areas, does not
find much space in media and societal discourse, either. So much so, the larger developmental
agenda of the Government, encompassing all of Sri Lanka has gained greater currency in adminis-
trative parlance or, so it seems.6
Added to this, there is another dimension of community perception of the post-war environment.
A significant number of Sri Lankans were, and continue to be, more concerned about the coun-
try’s economy, particularly the escalating cost of living. This is also supported by a BBC report
that stated ‘rising unemployment and a high cost of living has contributed to voter disgruntle-
ment’.7 There is now a growing expectation that the government should compensate for the
sacrifices that so many ordinary Sri Lankans made during the war.8 This belief is reinforced
by interviewees, including a Sinhalese part-time labourer ‘Rohana’ whose comments were
representative of the aspirations of the public at large, possibly highlighting the underlying frus-
tration of people post-war:
the war is over, but the prices of foodstuffs are still high. How can poor people live like this . . . we
made a lot of sacrifices for the war . . . the government will now save lots of money as the war is over
and why can’t the government use this money to reduce prices to give us some relief from high living
costs?9
Despite the reservations expressed by significant numbers of Sri Lankans during the election
campaigns, the incumbent president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, was returned to power with an
impressive 57.88% of the vote, defeating his opponent, the decorated war hero, General
Sarath Fonseka, who secured 40.15% of the vote.10 Winning the war, eradicating LTTE terror
activities and offering a prosperous future, ‘suba anagathayak’, were the key messages commu-
nicated to the electorate, which had the biggest appeal amongst the rural Sinhala masses.
An editor of an English daily newspaper, Daily Mirror, in his Editorial of 28 January this
year, published the following statement on the outcome of the election:
A slew of government ministers went on to whip up the nationalist sentiments and a strong section of
the media propagated the theory . . . [that] [a]ll sins were forgotten and en bloc they voted forMahinda
Rajapaksa . . . the fact that the opposition candidate garnered the maximum support from Tamil and
Muslim areas has helped the Sinhala voters to justify their decision to vote for Rajapaksa.11
As indicated above, one of the major challenges that President Rajapaksa now faces is his extre-
mely poor performance in the Tamil-speaking Northern and Eastern provinces which strongly
favoured the opposition candidate. In the Northern Jaffna and Vanni districts, Rajapaksa only
secured 24.75% and 27.31% of the votes respectively, as against 63.84% and 66.88% votes
secured by his opponent. Similar results were reflected in the Eastern province of Batticaloa dis-
trict where Rajapaksa obtained 26.27% of the votes in contrast to his opponent who secured
68.93% of the votes.12
6 N. Sathia Moorthy, ‘Reconciliation, Post-War and Post-Poll, Daily Mirror, Opinion, February 22, 2010.
7 ‘Q&A: Post-war Sri Lanka’, BBC World News, January 25, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2405347.
stm (accessed February 5, 2010).
8 C. Gunathilaka, ‘People Did the War, People Should Do the Balance’, Daily Mirror, January 21, 2009.
9 Personal interview held on February 14, 2010, Mt Lavinia, Sri Lanka.
10 ‘The Grand Consolidation’, Editorial, Daily Mirror, January 28, 2010, A14.
11 Ibid.
12 ‘Presidential Elections 2010’, Daily Mirror, 28 January 2010, A9–12.
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These statistics are reflected in the sentiments that were echoed by Tamil and Muslim resi-
dents in Jaffna and Batticaloa. A prominent Tamil businessman in Jaffna, ‘Raja’, and a senior
Muslim public servant, ‘Zub’, from Batticaloa, emphasized that considerable work needs to
be done before the government could win the trust of the people in the Northern and Eastern
provinces. Raja was more conciliatory despite his traumatic experience as an IDP and stated:
We do not have any issues with the Sinhala people or the Army . . . LTTE and many of the Tamil
leaders missed several opportunities for peace and stability in our region due to their intransigence
. . . however, it is big disappointment that the President does not seem to want to do anything regard-
ing reconciliation efforts after winning the war.13
Contrary to ‘Raja’, ‘Zub’ was more antagonistic: ‘We do not care what happens in the elections
. . . who wins or loses . . . nobody is going to help us’.14
The above discussion demonstrates that the polarization of voters based on ethnic lines has
left the Tamil and Muslim populations increasingly distrustful of a government with such sig-
nificant Sinhala support, and uncertain about their future with regard to reconciliation and reinte-
gration efforts.
Anecdotal evidence is also supported by media opinion following the elections where it has
been suggested that ‘the President’s post-war policies had deepened rather than resolved the
grievances that generated and sustained the Tamil Tigers for so long’.15 The following com-
ments of Ramachandran, an Indian journalist and researcher reporting for Asia Times (Hong
Kong), provide further support to this view. The Indian Government
was hoping that with his re-election out of the way, Rajapaksa would quickly settle down to addres-
sing the ethnic conflict. But there have been no signs or statements issued on this matter in the three
weeks since his landslide victory. . . . It is not just Rajapaksa’s procrastination on a political solution
to the ethnic conflict that is worrying India. Delhi is concerned over Tamil alienation.16
Further explosive dimensions of the post-war environment following the elections are the oppo-
sition’s claims of government election-rigging, violence against the opposition of undue pro-
portions, attempted assassinations and bombing of opposition election offices, accusations of
disfranchisement of voters due to deficiencies in the registration system and irregularities in
counting of votes.17
Aside from the above, the arrest of the opposition presidential candidate General Fonseka on
alleged conspiracy and corruption charges has decreased the efficacy of any attempts to rebuild
peace in the country. It is asserted that ‘where urgent development of the war-ravaged areas and
drastic reduction in the spiraling cost of living should have been the first items on the agenda,
attacks on the media, curtailing freedom of expression and whipping up sectarian rhetoric
have taken priority’.18
The editorial comments continued with a pessimistic outlook for the upcoming general elec-
tions and subsequently for establishing a constructive environment for peacebuilding:
If the President and his men continue on this path of aggression in their attempt to root out all forms
of opposition and dissent . . . the next two months will witness a seamless continuation of the terrible
abuse of state resources and personnel, the collusion and connivance of the police and armed forces
in denying civilians of their democratic rights, and open threats of retribution to those who do not
vote with the government.19
13 Personal interview held on February 5, 2010, Jaffna, Sri Lanka.
14 Personal interview held on January 22, 2010, Batticaloa, Sri Lanka.
15 ‘BBC News Report’, Daily Mirror, January 28, 2010, A4.
16 S. Ramachandran, ‘India Uneasy over Sri Lanka’s Side’, Asia Times Online, February 17, 2010.
17 G. Weerakoon, ‘Towards a Sovereign, Independent, Banana Republic’, Sunday Leader, February 7, 2010, 5.
18 ‘The Stench of a Government’s Fear has Fouled the Air’, Editorial, Sunday Leader, February 21, 2010, 12.
19 Ibid.
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There is sufficient evidence therefore that the present political environment in Sri Lanka is
highly volatile and tense. It illustrates some of the most flammable factors in ethnic relations:
language, religion, divergent historical narratives and continuing separatist agitation. The
history of the war is often debated, with personal suffering and political pragmatism driving
diverse and often contrary historical narratives.20 The post-war presidential election does not
appear to have brought with it a shift in momentum and action that the masses expected. Recon-
struction and reconciliation efforts are significant and require a prioritized focus and a serious-
ness of purpose that, from anecdotal evidence, is yet to be established.
However, there is hope that if the political power struggle can be contained, and the political
lens shifts to prioritize the burning issues facing the people of Sri Lanka, positive change can be
institutionalized. The President, Mahinda Rajapaksa, with his new mandate and with the consti-
tutional authority he possesses, is in a position to catalyze and facilitate strategies to rebuild
peace and focus on economic stability in the country. The Daily Mirror Editorial of 28
January 2010 was quite relevant in this regard:
It is only Mahinda Rajapaksa, who has now emerged the undisputed leader among the Sinhalese who
[can] put an end to this vicious cycle of communal politics that had been fragmenting this country for
decades. With the kind of mandate he has got this time the President can genuinely reach out to the
Tamils andMuslims without having to look over his shoulder to see whether the Sinhalese who voted
for the president will be more than happy to trace the traditional means of co-existence with the
Tamil and Muslim brethren and start from where they stopped decades ago.21
Acknowledging the current political climate in Sri Lanka is only part of developing a sustainable
strategy for rebuilding peace and reconstructing the economy. In order to fully appreciate Sri
Lanka’s political and social context, one must also understand the post-colonial history of the
war and the perceived underlying causes.
Underlying causes of the conflict – failure of state formation and nation-
building
Sri Lanka’s 21 million people present an ethnic, religious and linguistic mosaic, and at the centre
of Sri Lanka’s war is the way in which ‘democratic political modernity evolved in a context for
ethnic-majoritarian construction of state power’ without accommodating the interests and needs
of its multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual society.22
There is a nexus between development that reinforces a centralized state and the ideology of
‘nation-building’ that often dominated post-colonial societies.23 To build a nation, it was seen as
important to establish an over-arching ‘modern national’ identity. This identity, however, was
infused with the interests of the majority. So, the ‘dominant development discourse that went
along with the nation-building thesis served the interests of dominant nationalism, which, as
in many countries, coincided with the ethnic nationalism of the majority ethnic group’.24
Since independence, the Sri Lankan state has implemented many strategies and a number of
20 K.M. de Silva, ‘Sri Lanka: Keeping the Peace in a Sharply Divided Society’, available at Virtual Library Sri Lanka,
http://www.lankalibrary.com/pol/background.htm (accessed February 16, 2010).
21 ‘The Grand Consolidation’, Editorial, Daily Mirror, January 28, 2010, A14.
22 J. Uyangoda, ‘Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict: “Root Causes”’: Excerpts from International Seminar: Envisioning New
Trajectories for Peace in Sri Lanka 7–9 April 2006, Zurich, Switzerland: Session 1: Causes of the Conflict &
Factors Leading to Ceasefire; Organized by the Centre for Just Peace and Democracy (CJPD) in collaboration
with the Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies, Sri Lanka Office, http://www.tamilnation.org/
conflictresolution/Tamileelam/seminar_06_Zurich/01uyangoda.html (accessed March 9, 2010).
23 S. Bastian, ‘The Failure of State Formation, Identity Conflict and Civil Society Responses – The Case of Sri Lanka’,
Working Paper 2, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, 1999.
24 Ibid., 9.
Global Change, Peace & Security 369
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 0
3:
12
 2
2 
No
ve
mb
er
 2
01
0
legislative reforms, most notably in language and education, which has resulted in the creation of
a unitary state that has been over-identified with Sinhala Buddhist interests.
Social and economic developments during the early colonial period such as the commercia-
lization of agriculture and the registration of land titles in particular left a legacy of conscious
ethnic divisions; identifying citizens by their ethnicity and freezing ethnic boundaries.25 Due
to the predominance of racial theories in Europe at that time, differences in Sri Lankan
society were identified on racial grounds despite the word ‘race’ being difficult to define in
Sinhalese or Tamil, even to date. So, communalization of Sri Lankan society became a lived
thing and reproduced colonial power. Economic developments under the British made the demo-
graphic picture in Sri Lanka more complex.26 Economic activity was focused on the central and
western districts, which became disadvantageous for both Sinhala and Tamil communities. This
was because the British colonizers found the central and western districts climatically suitable
for establishing tea and rubber plantations. These plantations were established in areas where
majority Sinhalese villages existed. The British acquired the land predominantly owned by
Sinhala farmers for paddy and subsistence agriculture and used it to establish plantations, displa-
cing the rural Sinhalese from their land. The Tamil communities in the north and north-east were
disadvantaged because most of the economic activity was concentrated in the south and west.
Consequently, Tamils moved en masse to seek employment in the civil service and in the
private sector.27 With increased economic migration of Tamils from the north and east to the
southern and central regions, Tamil traders also began establishing themselves in these regions.
With western- and Christian-influenced education, there emerged a new social stratum of an
educated English-speaking Tamil minority.28 This was greatly beneficial for the British admin-
istration which used Tamils as cheap labour resources. Furthermore, the establishment of tea
plantations stimulated economic growth and created opportunities for Sinhala and Tamil entre-
preneurs.
With continued development, a bourgeois class of Sinhala-speaking people emerged. These
Sinhala speakers were heavily engaged in the construction of a social and religious culture of
nationalism, establishing an anti-colonial stance and reconnecting the masses with traditions
from which they felt alienated during European colonization.29 However, the Sinhala bourgeoi-
sie found its expansion constrained in various areas. Import and export trade was dominated by
the British and Indians and other retail and mercantile arenas were dominated by Muslim and
South Indian Chettiar traders. Sinhala traders were not able to break the status quo given the
lack of access to finance which was controlled by British bankers or Chettiars.30
These barriers to their advancement were perceived by many Sinhalese, at all levels, as being
caused by the hostile, non-Sinhala elements of Dravidian expansionism, international trade,
Christianity, colonialism and modernity.31 As Rajasingham-Senanayake highlights, ‘ethno-reli-
gious explanations . . . tend[ed] to elide . . . [the] diverse and religious ethnic communities [that]
had co-existed, mixed and mingled for centuries in . . . Sri Lanka, giving rise to plural; [sic] and
multicultural societies’.32 Forces of Sinhalese nationalism, perpetuating myths of eternal and
25 K. Jayawardhana, ‘Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka and Regional Security’, 1987, http://www.infolanka.com/org/
srilanka/issues/kumari.html (accessed February 5, 2010).
26 I. Ahmed, ‘Communal Conflict in Modern Sri Lanka: Search for a Resolution’, The International Journal of Peace
Studies, http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol1_2/Ahmed.htm (accessed January 28, 2010).
27 Jayawardhana, ‘Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka and Regional Security’.
28 Y. Ali, ‘Sri Lanka’s Recent History of Ethnic Conflict Originates from its Colonial Legacy’: http://www.hweb.org.
uk/content/view/27/4/ (accessed March 2, 2010).
29 Ahmed, ‘Communal Conflict in Modern Sri Lanka: Search for a Resolution’.
30 Jayawardhana, ‘Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka and Regional Security’.
31 Ali, ‘Sri Lanka’s Recent History of Ethnic Conflict Originates from its Colonial Legacy’; Jayawardhana, ‘Ethnic
Conflict in Sri Lanka and Regional Security’.
32 D. Rajasingham-Senanayake, ‘Transnational Peace Building and Conflict: Lessons from Aceh, Indonesia and Sri
Lanka’, SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia, 211, no. 25 (October 2009): 3.
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ancient conflicts with Tamils, gathered strength after independence.33 Moreover, as Tamils in
the colonial administration, business and learned professions thrived under the British, the
Tamil English-educated sector increasingly felt superior to its Sinhalese counterparts who
were largely Sinhala-educated, intensifying Sinhala anxieties and resentments. Post-colonial
tensions also fuelled the emergence of a potent Sinhalese hegemonic, ethno-nationalist
project and an exclusivist consciousness among some Sinhala politicians, leveraging on histori-
cal interpretations of Sinhalese identity and creating a dominant ideology for the ruling elite.34 In
the build-up to independence, the emerging Sinhalese nationalist movement sought to reinforce
its momentum by petitioning for proportionate representation for ethnic groups within the new
indigenous constitution.35
By February 1948, a distinctly majoritarian constitution had been perpetuated and the con-
servative Sinhalese, D.S. Senanayake, was the first prime minister of independent Sri Lanka.
Senanayake’s government was dominated by wealthy Sinhalese landowners who had little in
common with the rural masses. The emerging nationalist movement, motivated by the majority
Sinhalese government, perceived that the Tamil minority had access to a disproportionate share
of power, as a consequence of educational opportunities under colonial arrangements, and
attempted to strike a balance. State control over trade, industry, education and politics was jus-
tified on the grounds that it helped curb the influence of foreign and minority dominance.36
Short-sighted measures that were meant to generate fairness and equality of opportunity
instead catalyzed a surge of anti-Tamil feeling.37
Driven by the intensified fervour of post-colonial nationalism, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike
was elected prime minister in 1956, with the main election promise of establishing Sinhalese
as the official language of the country, replacing English. The passing of the so-called ‘Sinha-
lese Only Bill’38 gave no power of parity to the Tamil language.39 At the same time, Sinhala
became the language of command in the armed forces. Various regiments were named after
Sinhala kings who had defeated Tamil invaders in pre-colonial times.40 So, language was poli-
ticized and it became a powerful tool in the organization and reproduction of linguistic
racism.41
By the mid-1970s, mainstream Tamil politicians were publicly advocating the establishment
of a separate state where they perceived Tamils would be able to enjoy the educational and
employment opportunities denied to them in the new ‘Sinhalese Sri Lanka’.42 Moreover,
while their espousal of federalism throughout the 1950s and 1960s had won them significant
support among the Tamil people, this new, clear position captured the imagination of the
public and was quickly welcomed throughout Tamil areas. This reinforced and legitimized
33 P. Ragupathy, Tamil Social Formation in Sri Lanka: A Historical Outline (R.S. Visakan for Institute of Research and
Development, Madras, 1986), 3–11; C. McGinn, ‘Conflict Resolution and Transitional Justice in Sri Lanka:
International Experiences and Applications’, Ethnic Studies Report XVIII (2000): 159–78.
34 McGinn, ‘Conflict Resolution and Transitional Justice in Sri Lanka’; Bastian, ‘The Failure of State Formation,
Identity Conflict and Civil Society Responses’.
35 Jayawardhana, ‘Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka and Regional Security’.
36 Ahmed, ‘Communal Conflict in Modern Sri Lanka’.
37 S. Perera, The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: A Historical and Sociopolitical Outline; Department of Sociology, the
University of Colombo, 1999, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSRILANKA/Resources/App1.pdf (accessed
March 3, 2010); Jayawardhana, ‘Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka and Regional Security’; G. Dyer, ‘Destroying
Tamil Tigers Won’t Lead to Peace in Sri Lanka’, http://www.straight.com/article-201602/gwynne-dyer-sri-lanka-
after-war (accessed February 27, 2010).
38 Official Language Act, No. 33 of 1956.
39 Perera, The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: A Historical and Sociopolitical Outline; Jayawardhana, ‘Ethnic Conflict in
Sri Lanka and Regional Security’; McGinn, ‘Conflict Resolution and Transitional Justice in Sri Lanka’.
40 Bastian, ‘The Failure of State Formation, Identity Conflict and Civil Society Responses’.
41 Ahmed, ‘Communal Conflict in Modern Sri Lanka: Search for a Resolution’.
42 International Crisis Group, ‘Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace Process’.
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for many Tamils their need for a separate state and eventually drove some Tamil youth to
organize themselves into armed groups for the purpose of establishing a Tamil homeland.43
On 24 July 1983, following a deadly LTTE ambush of a military convoy in Jaffna which
killed 13 Sri Lankan Army soldiers, gangs of Sinhalese extremists, in a retributive backlash,
rioted, killing hundreds of Tamils and destroying scores of Tamil-owned residences and
businesses across the country.44 The riots continued for days until government forces were
sent in to regain control. Many observers see the events during July 1983 as a turning point
where institutionalized political violence and brutalization became the key feature of the
war.45 It was at this time that many Tamils fled Sri Lanka and gained entry to India, Australia,
Canada, the UK and many other European countries, mostly as refugees and asylum seekers.
This widespread Tamil diaspora began voluntarily, and then under coercion, to fund the separa-
tist activities of the LTTE movement. These activities were illegal, conducted secretly and were
often carried out under the guise of humanitarian aid. The Tamil diaspora in many countries
became an institutionalized agency to support the armed conflict of the LTTE against the gov-
ernment. The movement traded in drugs and covert business activities to collect funds for arms
and other military equipment which resulted in the LTTE being declared a terrorist organization
and outlawed in several countries.46
The war in Sri Lanka is a story heavily coloured by identity politics. There are significant
parallels between extremist ideologies of Tamil nationalism and extremist Sinhala nationalism
‘highlighting primordialist interpretations of ethnicity and a claim over land – classic tenets of
political chauvinism’.47 Some assert that the island is inhabited, politically, by two ‘nations’,
each perceiving itself as endangered, and each demanding its own concept of self-determination
to guarantee economic opportunities and preserve cultural identity.48
Sri Lanka’s possible path to peace
Given its complexity, there is no fixed formula for addressing the root causes and the conse-
quences of the war. Following the jubilation over the defeat of the LTTE, no clear articulation
exists in respect of the GoSL or of the Tamil representative groups of a transparent and common
strategic framework that could guide the peacebuilding process and help mobilize public support
in the reforms of the state.
There is, however, a low-cost path to conflict management and resolution. It is political
engagement.49 This requires a long period of constructive political engagement between the
state and Tamil groups. It also requires social transformation through support for civil society
peace activism and economic improvements, particularly in contested areas, where people,
regardless of ethnicity, have the possibility of leading freer and more fulfilling lives, expanding
43 K. Tirmizey and J. Spencer ‘Roots of Conflict in Sri Lanka’, interview 2006, Mostly Water website: http://
mostlywater.org/roots_of_conflict_in_sri_lanka (accessed January 28, 2010); K. Stokke and N. Shanmugaratnam,
‘Development as a Precursor to Conflict Resolution: A Critical Review of the Fifth Peace Process in Sri Lanka’
(Department of International Environment & Development Studies, Noragric, Norwegian University of Life
Sciences (UMB), 2004), 1–27.
44 A. Keenan, ‘Sri Lanka: Between Peace and War’, openDemocracy (Online Journal), 2005, http://www.
opendemocracy.net (accessed February 2, 2010); McGinn, ‘Conflict Resolution and Transitional Justice in Sri
Lanka: International Experiences and Applications’; Tirmizey and Spencer, ‘Roots of Conflict in Sri Lanka’.
45 Tirmizey and Spencer, ‘Roots of Conflict in Sri Lanka’; Perera, The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka; Keenan, ‘Sri
Lanka: Between Peace and War’.
46 Institute for Conflict Management (2010), http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/ terroristoutfits/
Ltte.htm (accessed February 18, 2010).
47 Bastian, ‘The Failure of State Formation, Identity Conflict and Civil Society Responses’, 24.
48 A.W. Jeyaratnam and A.J. Chandrakanthan, ‘Tamil Identity and Aspirations’, Conciliation Resources, 1998, http://
www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sri-lanka/tamil-identity-aspirations.php (accessed February 21, 2010).
49 J. Uyangoda, ‘Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict: “Root Causes”’. Excerpts from International Seminar: Envisioning New
Trajectories for Peace in Sri Lanka, Lucerne, Switzerland, 2006.
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their capabilities ‘to lead the kind of lives they value – and have reason to value’.50 It is impor-
tant to note that one must ‘look beyond the culturalism or “ethnic” narrative, and understand the
embedded social and economic inequalities (intra-group dynamics of inter-group conflicts) and
address these issues as part of an inclusive, hence, sustainable peace process’. As such, there is a
need to ‘de-ethnicize the analysis and move beyond the culturalist’ representation of the war.51
Addressing what has been understood as root causes of the war can only begin to address the
war. Identifying and addressing the consequences of the war is equally important.52 The war has
produced immense humanitarian problems that include mass displacement, loss of lives,
property and resources, arbitrary arrests, detention and involuntary disappearances, curtailment
of the freedom of expression, association and mobility as well as the social and economic
destruction of infrastructure in the country, particularly in the North and East, fuelling intensified
disillusionment and reinforcing claims of discrimination.53
Relief, restitution and relocation
The first step in peacebuilding involves addressing the front-line humanitarian concerns. In the
post-Holocaust world, states have committed themselves to a human rights culture and there is a
necessity for the GoSL to restore basic economic rights.54 The state has mobilized relief and has
facilitated passage of NGO and humanitarian organizations to support the restitution effort,
however this effort must continue with proper supervision to ensure the continued distribution
of basic aid to the civilian population who have been victims of the war. It is incumbent on
the GoSL to collaborate with organizations that deal with such emergencies to effectively
relieve these communities.
Moreover, basic infrastructure in war zones has been devastated. Sri Lanka has expressed its
preference for regional assistance, therefore India, as a major regional power and a solid
diplomatic and trade partner, can play a dominant partnership role in the reconstruction of the
war-ravaged region.55 Schools and hospitals have to be built; housing, electricity, water
systems and communications need restoration; and roads and other transport systems have to
be reconstructed. International aid is required in order to facilitate this and such aid needs to
be transparent. As Rajasingham-Senanayake asserts, ‘[a] lack of transparency regarding disbur-
sement . . . [can] erode the peace process’.56
With the rebuilding of infrastructure comes the relocation of war victims. Living in camps
for interminable periods is counterproductive to peace.57 Relocation has to be a firm policy to
build peace. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
and the Red Cross, approximately 156,000 IDPs have returned to their districts, however
approximately 108,000 still remain displaced and in refugee camps.58
50 A. Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 18.
51 Rajasingham-Senanayake, ‘Transnational Peace Building and Conflict’, 10.
52 K. Loganathan and N. Ropers, ‘Conceptualizing a Road Map for Peace in Sri Lanka’ (2002), 1–29: http://www.
cpalanka.org/research_papers/Road_Map_Paper_1.pdf (accessed January 27, 2010); Stokke and Shanmugaratnam,
‘Development as a Precursor to Conflict Resolution’.
53 Uyangoda, ‘Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict: “Root Causes”’; K. Stokke, ‘After the Tsunami: A Missed Opportunity for
Peace in Sri Lanka’, The Tsunami and its Social and Political Implications, NIASnytt no. 2 (2005): 12–13.
54 J. Baylis and S. Smith, The Globalization of World Politics – An Introduction to International Relations, 2nd ed.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
55 K. Kinoti, ‘Crisis in Sri Lanka’, excerpts from an Association of Women’s Rights in Development (AWID), inter-
view with Kumudini Samuel, 2009, http://www.awid.org/eng/Issues-and-Analysis/Library/Crisis-in-Sri-Lanka
(accessed February 12, 2010).
56 Rajasingham-Senanayake, ‘Transnational Peace Building and Conflict’, 211–35.
57 Kinoti, ‘Crisis in Sri Lanka’.
58 International Crisis Group, Sri Lanka: A Bitter Peace, Asia Briefing No. 99, January 11, 2010, http://www.
crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6462&l=1.
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Reconciliation, political development and the capability approach
However, restitution, reconstruction and relocation will not bring reconciliation. Any humanitar-
ian aid campaign must be a prelude to a political enterprise. There needs to be a long-term focus
on reconciliation. There are very few models of reconciliation that currently exist that are rooted
in the principles of universal human rights. Ireland and South Africa are often used as represen-
tations of societies evolving from oppression towards equity and justice. A similar model needs
to be established in Sri Lanka to diffuse the deep-seated prejudice that has been inculcated at
many levels within community groups.59
Peace, in this context, is about rebuilding trust between all Sri Lankan community groups and
particularly winning the trust of the Tamil community that the GoSL can find a political solution
to accommodate all Sri Lankans. There is no denying that the LTTE was ruthless in the pursuit of
a separate homeland, however Sinhalese chauvinism of the majority also gave the Tamil commu-
nity much to resent. So rebuilding trust by involving the citizenry in political development is a
significant priority for the state if peacebuilding is to be successful and sustainable.60
This can be achieved through a strong focus on civil and political rights. Inclusive partici-
pation is constitutive of development and political progress.61 If people are to be free they
must be able to assert their voices within a political framework, where the emphasis is placed
on equal participation in development processes. This then draws attention to the idea of democ-
racy and civil and political rights, highlighting a nominal relationship between democracy, civil
and political rights and development.62
Sen’s Capability Approach presents a more expansive understanding of political develop-
ment and engagement and stresses opportunity improvement in the dimensions of civil partici-
pation, health and education. So, freedoms or the expansion of people’s capabilities are
dependent on substantive determinants, ‘such as social and economic arrangements, as well
as political and civil rights’.63 This implies that peacebuilding strategies ‘must be democratic,
not just in the “thin” sense of having leadership succession determined by a regular electoral
process, but in the “thick” sense of messy and continuous involvement of the citizenry’.64
Acknowledging that participatory strategies require the protection of liberties and freedoms,
respect for legal entitlements and the guaranteeing of free discussion and uncensored distribution
of news and fair comment,65 the GoSL needs to establish and support good governance. This
must emphasize advancing economic, social and political rights which reinforce the ‘stability
of the infrastructure [and] the enabling environment, for a democracy that evolves from
within the societies involved’, which in turn strengthens the prospects for sustainability of
participation and development.66
The exercising of freedoms associated with civil and political rights is therefore pivotal to
the restoration of trust between communities in Sri Lanka and for providing platforms for
voices that may otherwise be confined and restricted. After all, one cannot expect that the
59 Bastian, ‘The Failure of State Formation, Identity Conflict and Civil Society Responses’; T. Fernandis et al., ‘The
Sri Lankan Peace Process at a Crossroads – Lessons, Opportunities and Ideas for Principled Negotiations and
Conflict Transformation’ (Colombo, Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies, 2004); M. Clarke, ‘The Tigers are
Beaten, But It Isn’t Over Yet’, 2009, Times Online, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_
contributors/article6314769.ece (accessed February 18, 2010).
60 Clarke, ‘The Tigers are Beaten, But It Isn’t Over Yet’.
61 P. Evans, ‘Collective Capabilities, Culture and Amartya Sen’s Development as Freedom’, Studies in Comparative
International Development 37, no. 2 (2002): 55.
62 D. Kingsbury, Political Development (London: Routledge, 2007).
63 Sen, Development as Freedom, 3.
64 Evans, ‘Collective Capabilities, Culture and Amartya Sen’s Development as Freedom’, 55.
65 A. Sen, ‘Democracy as a Universal Value’, Journal of Democracy 10, no. 3 (1999): 10.
66 Ibrahim Shihata, ‘Democracy and Development’, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 46, no. 3
(1997): 641.
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mere existence of democratic institutions makes a country a democracy. Successful democracy
requires a strong civic society and the key requisite in building sustainable peace is total partici-
pation of both political and civil societies.
The factors that created the conditions for war and brutality have to be permanently removed.
With the military defeat and the political demise of the LTTE, history may be rewritten in Sri
Lanka; however it is more important to rewrite the conditions under which society will function
in future. The conflict will continue unless there is meaningful political dialogue that leads to a
transformative solution acceptable to all Sri Lankans.67 Through civil and political engagement,
led by the GoSL and supported by the international community and the Sri Lankan diaspora, a
solution can be found that is acceptable to the majority of Sri Lankans. There has been
inadequate engagement with the complexity of the conflict, ignoring the social and economic
inequalities which remained barriers to a sustainable peace process.68 There is also a need to
look beyond narrow ‘ethnic’ narratives, as much discussion has been focused on the rights of
Tamils and not the rights of the Sri Lankan people who constitute several ethnic groups. All
Sri Lankans must feel a sense of belonging. There must be acknowledgement of the fact that
all community groups have the same civil, political and cultural rights. Opportunities presented
by the political process must outweigh the option of violence for attention and political gain.
Only through political engagement and involvement of all community groups, particularly
Tamil voices, will Sri Lanka be able to truly win the campaign for peace.69
This essay has presented the current political environment following the war and presidential
elections based on analysis of media reports and on-the-ground anecdotal evidence. It then dis-
cussed the root causes of the war in Sri Lanka by analyzing the failure of state formation and
nation-building in post-independence Sri Lanka. The essay then outlined a path to possible
peace by, firstly, focusing on the short-term, immediate humanitarian needs, reconstruction
and relocation efforts. It then went on to reinforce the focus on long-term civil and political
rights, through the lens of the capabilities approach, to enable all Sri Lankans to become
co-owners of the peacebuilding process and, in so doing, expand freedoms and capabilities.
With the military defeat and the concurrent political demise of the LTTE leading to an end to
armed combat, humanitarian efforts and ‘political restructuring must take place together with
social transformation and inter ethnic reconciliation, justice and equality for any chance of sustain-
able peace in Sri Lanka. A just and positive peace can only be made possible through inclusive,
representative political negotiation’,70 one where all Sri Lankans have the opportunity to become
co-owners of the peacebuilding process and assert their voices in their freer, more fulfilling lives.
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